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OPTION CONTRACTS
There are various kinds of options; in all of them the option-
holder has a choice, a power of electing between alternatives.'
Usually this choice or power of electing is possessed'by only one
party, and for that reason the transaction is often referred to as
unilateral; but it is possible for both parties to a transaction to
have an option. Thus, in the case of any subsisting, unaccepted
offer, not yet become a contract, an option is possessed by both
parties; the offeree may accept or reject at his option;, the offerer
has the option of withdrawing his offer before acceptaice. Sdch
two-sided options as this will be touched upon hereafter only to
distinguish them. Their full discussion would cover the forma-
tion of almost all contracts. This article will be almost wholly
restricted to a discussion of so-called "binding options", or
option contracts giving to one the legal right of choice, but "no
such right to the other.
It might be said, also, that any party to a contract has the
option of performing his contract or of breaking it; but this is
not a lawful option, and both law and equity will do what they
can, consistently with justice, to prevent and punish his making
an illegal choice. This paper will not deal with the power of
doing illegal things.
Again, there are certain option contracts that are made illegal
by statutes the object of which is the prevention of gambling in
stocks and commodities. 2 These statutes do not make the exer-
cise of his power of choice by' an option-holder illegal; they for-
bid the making of the agreement by which one is given such a
power of choice. These statutes have raised some difficult ques-
tions and have caused the courts to draw fine distinctions. These
questions as to legality must also be excluded here.
1 The word "option" is derived from "opto", to choose. The Century
Dictionary defines it as, "(1) Choice, wish, preference, election; (2) the
power or liberty of choosing, the opportunity of electing, or selecting, av-
alternative, or one of several lines of conduct."
2 See Century Dictionary defining "option": "(4) On stock, or other
exchanges, a privilege, secured by the payment of a certain premium, or
consideration, either (1) of calling for the delivery, or (2) of making de-
livery, of a certain specified amount of some particular stock or 'produce, at
a specified price, and within specified limits- of time. The first kind of
option is usually designated a call, and the second a put; but both are
sometimes called futures."
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There remain for discussion, then, lawful transactions between
two parties where* it is their intention that one of them, but not
the other, shall have a lawful power of electing between alter-
natives affecting their legal relations with each other. Such
. options are of various sorts. An option may be granted in a sep-
arate and independent agreement, as where A pays B a sum of
money for an option to buy property at a fixed price within a
certain time. The property involved may be land, chattels, or
any commodity. On the other hand, the grant of an option may
be merely one term or provision in a larger agreement, as where
a lessee is given the option to purchase 3 or to receive an extension
of the lease,4 or where a partnership agreement provides that the
survivor shall have the option of buying the interest of the other
in case of death I or where a contract of sale gives also an option
on other property or gives the vendor the option to repurchase0
or where a lease or a contract of employment gives one party the
option of terminating it on certain terms,7 or where a note-holder
has the option of converting it into stock.8
The intention of giving such an option to one of the parties
may be expressed in various ways. There is no set and invaria-
ble form. It may be agreed that A shall have "the option to
buy", or "the first refusal", or the "right of pre-emption") The
3 McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257; Dowling v. Betjemann, 2
Johns. & Hem. 544.
4Hersey v. Giblett, 18 Beav. 174; Moss v. Barton, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 474;
Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Chan. D. 640.
5 Dibbins v. Dibbins, (1896) 2 Ch. 348; Hom fray v. Fothergill, 1 Eq.
567. 6 Barrel v. Sabine, 1 Vernon 268; Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq.
349.
7 Hanau v. Ehrlich (1912), A. C. 39 (H. of L.); Rust v. Conrad, 47Mich. 449 (lease); Singer S. M. Co. v. Union Co., Holmes 253; Pittsburg
Co. v. Bailey, 76 Kans. 42.
8 Campbell v. London & B. R. Co., 5 Hare 519, 529. There is also
another kind of option, called a contract in the alternative. Here the op-
tion is not between paying and not paying, or between doing and not doing;
it is between doing one thing and doing another. See Brantly on Cont.,
Sec. 156-160. Another sort of option contract is one whereby the owner
of goods agrees to sell the same at auction to the highest bidder without
reserve. Warlow v. Harrison, 1 E. & E. 316.
0 The terms of the option must not be too indefinite, or the contract
cannot be enforced. Fogg v. Price, 145 Mass. 513 ("if the premises are for
sale at any time, the lessee shall have the refusal of them." Held too in-
definite to enforce.) ; Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55; 23 N. J. Eq. 512
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agreement may be under seal or not sealed, with consideration
or without it, unilateral or bilateral. It may be a conditional con-
tract to convey, or a contract to keep an offer open. The form
in which such an agreement is expressed is an important matter.
Courts frequently overlook this fact and lay down general rules
as if they were applicable to all alike.
OPTION AGREEMENT WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.
Let us consider first an option agreement not under seal and
without consideration. Such an agreement is not binding on
either party and amounts to nothing more than an offer, revocable
at will by the offeror. 0  Such an offer may be accepted before
withdrawal, however, and then becomes a contract ,though not
an option contract." In Cooke v. Oxley, 2 the defendant agreed
to sell certain hogsheads of tobacco to the plaintiff at a price
named, provided the latter would give notice of acceptance.by
four o'clock. The plaintiff gave such notice before four o'clock,
but previously thereto the defendant had sold the tobacco to
another. The defendant had a right to do this, for prior to
acceptance there was no consideration for this agreement. The
court failed to consider the fact that there had been no formal
revocation of the offer, evidently thinking that a mere change of
mind by the offeror would prevent a contract from arising on
acceptance. If this was sound law then, it is so no longer.
In Great Northern R. Co. v. Witham,13 the defendant agreed
that the plaintiff might have, for one year, the option of buying
at certain rates such quantities of specified goods as the plaintiff
might choose to order. The plaintiff accepted this in writing.
Such an acceptance made no contract, because the plaintiff's op-
tional promise to order goods if it chose was no consideration.
(enforcement refused because no time was fixed during which the credit
to be given was to extend) ; Zimmermian v. Rhoads, 226 Pa. 174. An op-
tion very indefinite in character was enforced in Manchester Ship Canal
Co. v. Manchester R. Co. (1901),2 Ch. 37. In Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill.
403, an option to buy "at the same price per acre, as any other person or
purchaser might have offered" was enforced. See also Homnfray v. Fother-
gill, 1 Eq. 567.
10 Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653; Burnet v. Bisco, 4 johns. 235; Reese
Co. v. House, (Cal.) 124 Pac. 442.
11 B. & M. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224; Nyulasy v. Rowan, 17 Vict.
L. R. 663; Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5.
12 3 T. R. 653.
13L. R. 9 C. P. 16.
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But when the company, prior to any revocation of the defendant,
ordered a specific lot of goods, promising to pay the named prices,
a contract for the sale of this specific lot was completed. Prior
thereto there was no contract binding the defendant to give the
plaintiff an option; there was only an offer, and both parties had
an option. After acceptance by ordering specified goods, there
was a binding contract to sell, and neither party had an option;
the defendant was bound to deliver and the plaintiff was bound
to pay.
BINDING OPTIONS.
An agreement giving an option to one of the parties is binding
in case it is under seal or is based on consideration. Such an
agreement may be of the following classes: I. It may be an offer
of a promise for a promise (a bilateral contract), accompanied
by a contract not to withdraw the offer. This accompanying
contract must either be under seal or be based on consideration;
it is generally unilateral, being under seal or the consideration
having been paid. II. It may be an offer of a promise for an
act (a unilateral contract), accompanied by a contract to hold the
offer open as in the preceding case. III. It may be a unilateral
contract with an express condition precedent.
Often it will be difficult to determine to which of the three
classes an option contract belongs, because generally the parties
do not stop to analyze their own intentions and do not express
their agreement in unequivocal words. In such cases the courts
must do as they do in the construction of statutes,-give the
words the meaning that seems just and reasonable, the meaning
that the parties possibly would have expressed if they had thought
about it. The fact is, however, that the courts often do in this
matter just what the contracting parties did;. they determine the
obligations of the parties without analyzing the agreement any
more carefully than did the parties.14 In general, this results in
14There is a strong tendency on the part of courts and writers to
classify and define all options as falling under class I, whereas probably
most options belong to class III. "An option is an unaccepted offer";
McMillan v. Phila. Co., 159 Pa. 142. "An option is not an actual or exist-
ing contract, but is a right reserved in a subsisting agreement. In a certain
sense an option is a mere pollicitation, a promise without mutuality, not yet
ripened into a perfect agreement." Rivers v. Oak Lawn S .Co., 52 La. Ann.
762. "A contract by which the owner of property agrees with another per-
son that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within
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justice; but to arrive at justice in that way is a confession that
law is based upon morality and instinct, and not upon logic and
reasoned principles. There need be no hesitation in confessing
such a truth; but at the same time logical analysis is useful and
may possibly arrive at a reasoned principle capable of practical
application for a long time.
There is no doubt that to whichever of the three above classes
an option contract belongs, it is binding on the option-giver, and
for breach of it the option-holder can maintain an action for
damages. It is generally held also that the option contract will
be specifically enforced in equity if the remedy at law is inade-
quate; but there is some conflict. Let us consider each class
separately.
I. OFFER TO MAKE A BILATERAL CONTRACT.
(a) Option Contract Under Seal.
Suppose the following case: .4 offers a promise to sell his land
to B for a return promise to pay $1,000, acceptance to be within
thirty days, and promises under seal not to withdraw the offer
for that time. This amounts to two things; an offer to make a
bilateral contract in the future, and a completed unilateral con-
tract. The unilateral contract not to withdraw the offer is valid
and binding, and for its breach an action for damages will lie. 5
If it remains unbroken, and the offer to sell is accepted by B
within the time limited, there arises a bilateral contract to sell
and to buy, enforcible both at law and in equity. The obligation
of this contract and the remedy thereon are both mutual, and
there is not the least justification for those few cases refusing
specific performance .for lack of mutuality.16
But suppose that A attempts to break his contract to leave the
offer open, and notifies B that the offer is withdrawn. Can B
a certain time. He does not sell the land; he does not agree to sell it, but
he does sell something; that is, the right or privilege to buy at the elec-
tion of* the other party;" Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5. See also Sizer v.
Clark, 116 Wisc. 534; Johnston v. Trippe, 33 Fed. 530; Myers v. Stone,
128 Ia. 10; Clark on Cont., Sec. 22; 18 Harv. L. R. 457. When the parties
call the option contract a "refusal", it looks as if they regarded it as an
offer with a promise not to withdraw. It is so regarded by the court in
Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55.
15 Warlow v. Harrison, 1 E. & E. 316. A contract whereby one binds
himself to accept an offer is the same in character as one by which he
binds himself not to withdraw an offer.
36 Litz v. Goosling, 93 Ky. 185; 21 L. R. A. 127.
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later, but within the thirty days, accept the offer to sell, complete
the bilateral contract, and maintain an action at law for breach
of this latter contract to sell or a suit in equity for specific per-
formance? It is generally held that he can do both. Such a
ruling involves two difficulties. First, A has withdrawn his offer
and is no longer minded to sell, as B knows. Can a man be
forced into a contract against his will? In such a case there is
no meeting of the minds. Admitting that A contracted to keep
his offer open and to remain of a mind to sell, the fact is that he
did not do so. It is hardly correct to say that he could not break
that contract, for the fact is that he has broken it. Nor can he
be prevented from doing so, for he has control of his own mind
in spite of jails and punishments and of all that judges and chan-
cellors can do. If the foregoing be true, there is no contract for
the sale of the land for either law or equity to enforce. 7 In
Mier v. Hadden,8 Ostrander, J., says: "While it may seem at
first blush a legal paradox that a contract for the sale of land,
mutual and enforceable, can be made when at the time it is
claimed to have been made one party to it is openly protesting
that he will make no such contract, and while reasons may be
advanced to support the proposition that the option holder should
be in such a case remitted to an action for damages for refusal
to hold the offer open for the stipulated time, there is reason and
precedent for holding that the offer to sell, if paid for, may not
be withdrawn during the stipulated time, being in law a con-
tinuing offer to sell." If A is to be forced to convey against his
will or to pay damages for non-conveyance, it is because the law
is creating an obligation, quasi-contractual in character, based
neither on present consent nor upon unjust enrichment. Such
an obligation well deserves the name quasi-contract, because it
is precisely like the obligation that the offeror was previously
willing to assume, and not only does the court pretend that it is
a real contract, but it enforces it exactly as if it were one. In
this it differs from other so-called quasi-contracts. As to them,
the remedy is in debt or indebitatus assumpsit for an amount
measured by the defendant's unjust enrichment; while in the
case under discussion the remedy is in express assumpsit for an
17 See, taking this view, note, 21 L. R. A. 130. Hanley v. Watterson,
39 W. Va. 214; Rease v. Kittle, (W. Va.) 49 S. E. 1501 Newton v. Newton,
11 R. 1. 390.
is 148 Mich. 488.
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amount measured by the extent of the plaintiff's disappointment
as in the case of real agreements. In a case like this, both law
and equity say to the defendant, as equity often says in other
cases, You ought to have kept your offer open; we shall treat
that as done which ought to have been done, and hold you as ifit had been done. But this is quasi-contract, not contract; it is
an obligation based upon righteousness, not upon consent. Thereis no real objection to creating such an obligation, but only the
superficial one that some thousands of judges have said that they
cannot make contracts for parties.
The second difficulty, referred to above, exists only in equity
where a bill is brought for specific performance. It is generallyheld that equity will not decree specific performance of a con-
tract without consideration even though it is under seal. In the
foregoing case, the creation of an obligation to convey the landis the specific enforcement of the promise of A to hold his offer
open for thirty days. But there was no consideration for this
promise. A similar difficulty exists if we regard the obligation
as quasi-contractual, although quasi-contract does not purport tobe based upon consideration. The obligation of quasi- contract isbased upon equity and good conscience, and in general these are
held to give rise to an obligation only where there is an unjust
enrichment. In the present case there has been no -such enrich-
ment; nothing whatever has been added to A's wealth and noth-ing whatever has been subtracted from B's. For the same reason
the obligation of A to convey cannot be said to rest upon the
doctrine of estoppel, for there has been no representation of factby A, nor has B in any respect changed his position. His mere
acceptance cannot in itself be regarded as a material change of
position; and if, since acceptance, such a change has taken place,
it has been with full kiowledge of A's previous revocation.
Thus it appears that in cases where A's offer has been revoked
prior to acceptance, his obligation to convey, subsequently arising.
from such acceptafice, can hardly be based upon recognized prin-
ciples of contract or of quasi-coritract, either legal or equitable,
and it can be specifically enforced only by disregarding another
generally recognized principle. Nevertheless, it has been specifi-
cally enforced,19 and damages are collectible at law.
10 O'Brien v. Boland, 166 Mass. 481; Cummins V. Beavers, 103 Va. 230;Watkins v. Robertson, 105 Va. 269 (cf. Graybill v. Brugh, 89 Va. 895).
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based upon equity and good conscience, and in general these are
held to give rise to an obligation only where there is an unjust
enrichment. In the present case there has been no -such enrich-
ment; nothing whatever has been added to A's wealth and noth-
ing whatever has been subtracted from B's. For the same reason
the obligation of A to convey cannot be sai4 to rest upon the
doctrine of estoppel, for there has been no representation of fact
by A, nor has B in any respect changed his position. is ere
acceptance cannot in itself be regarded as a material change of
position; ,and if, since acceptance, such a change has taken place,
it has been with full kriowledge of A's previous revocation.
Thus it appears that in cases where A's offer has been revoked
prior to acceptance, his obligation to convey, subsequently arising-
from such acceptance, can hardly be based upon recognized prin-
ciples of contract or of quasi-contract, either legal or equitable,
and it can be specifically enforced only by disregarding another
generally recognized principle. Neverthel~ss, it has been specifi-
cally enforced,19 and damages are collectible at law.
19 O'Brien v. Bolalld, 166 Mass. 481; Cf,mmi11s~. Beavers, 103 Va. 230;
Watkills v. Robertso11, 105 Va. 269 (el. Graybill v. Brugh, 89 Va. 895).
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(b) Option Contract Based on Consideration.
Suppose the following case: A offers a promise to sell his land
to B for a promise to pay $1,000, acceptance to be within thirty
days; and promises for $10 paid by B not to withdraw the offer
for that time. This case is just like the one preceding, except
that a consideration of $10 is substituted for a seal. Just as
before, this transaction consists of an offer to make a bilateral
contract to sell and to buy, with a unilateral contract to hold the
offer open for thirty days. Just as before, acceptance by B be-
fore revocation of the offer completes a bilateral contract for the
sale of the land, enforcible both at law and in equity against both
parties. In case A revokes before acceptance, the same problems
arise as in case of the offer under seal, with two differences. As
before, there is no meeting of the minds, and hence no real agree-
ment to convey. But there is a small enrichment of A, which
may be made the basis of a quasi-contract. B paid A $10 for a
promise, and the promise has been broken. In such cases B has
a right to sue for damages, or he may sue in quasi-contract for
restitution. In the latter case his recovery would be limited to
the amount received by A, his unjust enrichment. But this is
far from being the same as an obligation to convey the land. The
consideration of $10 also relieves equity of the difficulty involved
in specifically enforcing a sealed promise without consideration.
Mutuality.
The two foregoing cases are alike in their lack of mutuality
of agreement at the moment of acceptance. They are alike also
in the matter of mutuality of obligation. Prior to acceptance by
Contra, Davis v. Petty, 147 Mo. 383; Corbett v. Cronkhite, 239 
Ill. 9
(three judges dissenting).
The case of Warlow v. Harrison, 1 E. & E. 316, also appears to 
be
"contra.in principle. An owner of -a horse contracted with all comers 
to
sell it at auction to the highest bidder witlout reserve. Plaintiff 
was the
highest bidder but defendant refused to accept the bid. It was 
held that
there was no contract of sale upon which the plaintiff could sue, 
but that
he must sue, if at all, for. breach of the. preliminary contract not 
to with-
drav 'the horse from sale. The measure of damages in the 
two actions
would no doubt be identical.
A sealed option, without consideration, should always be 
specifically
enforced, if the option holder has performed an onerous 
condition in re-
liance upon it. Such performance may not be technical consideration, 
but
it is sufficient basis for an equitable estoppel. See Wilks v. Ga. Pac. R. R.,
79 Ala. 180.
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B, the contract was unilateral, and A alone was under an obliga-
tion. B had an option. This lack of mutuality of obligation is
no objection to the enforcement of A's contract, either at law or
in equity. The doctrine that equity will not enforce specific per-
formance against A unless the same remedy is available against
B was exploded by Mr. Ames20 and others, and was in fact never
followed generally by the courts. A unilateral contract to convey
land, for an executed consideration, has always been enforced
specifically.2 1 This remedy should never be refused, on the
ground of want of mutuality, in case the contract is unilateral,
as is the case with the preliminary option contract above. A
promise under seal to convey land may not be specifically en-
forcible, but this is for lack of consideration, and not for want
of mutuality. A promissory note to repay money,-borrowed will
not be specifically enforced in equity, but this is because it is
specifically enforcible at law in debt or its equivalent, not for
want of mutuality. If a promisee has performed his own part of
the contract and his remedy at law is not adequate, he may be
sure of getting a decree for specific performance.
So, if A's proniise to hold the offer open was" given for $10
paid, the fact th at B was not bound to do anything'more, unless
he later makes a new promise, is no objection to a decree for
specific performance of A's promise. Equity must still wrestle
with the problem of whether it is possible for a court to prevent
a man from changing his mind, and to compel him to keep his
offer open; but this is very different from the question of mu-
tuality of -remedy. If it is possible for equity to keep A's offer
open, and if it was open when B accepted, there -arises a new
bilateral contract to sell and to buy, specifically enforcible against
both, and mutuality of remedy exists. 22
20 3 Col. L. Rev. 1 ; Lectures on Leg. Hist., 370.
21 Ames, 3 Col. L. R., 1; Howe v. Watson, (Mass.) 60 N. E. 415; 1
Ames Cases Eq. 429, and cases cited in Note 3. Anderson v. Anderson,
251 Ill. 415. The statement contra, in Bispham on Equity, in Sec. 377, must
be due to a misunderstanding of unilateral contracts.
22 It is often said that by bringing suit for specific performance, the
plaintiff subjects himself to the jurisdiction of equity and thus makes the
remedy mutual. See Richards v. Green, 23 N. J. Eq. 536; 'Woodruff v.
Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 439. This is equivalent to saying that mutuality of
remedy, existing prior to the bringing of a suit, is unnecessary.
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II. OFFER TO MAKE A UNILATERAL CONTRACT.
Suppose the following case: A offers to sell certain land to B
for $1,000, to be paid within thirty days, and promises for a con-
sideration, or under seal, not to withdraw the offer for thirty
days. This is an offer of a promise for an act, accompanied by
a unilateral contract to hold the offer open. The only difference
between this kind of an option and that contained above in T, is
in the mode of acceptance and'in the consequent situation of B.
Here a mere notice of acceptance with a promise to pay the
$1,000 would be of no effect. In this case acceptance must con-
sist of payment. A mere promise to pay would not bind A to
convey,, for A prescribed a different mode of acceptance. It
follows from this, that such a promise to pay does not bind B
either. There is no consideration for it. But if B accepts A's
offer as prescribed, and actually pays the money to A prior to
any revocation of A's offer, A becomes bound by his promise to
sell, both at law and in equity. In case A has revoked his offer
prior to payment by B, the very same problems arise as in class I.
B can undoubtedly sue for breach of A's promise not to revoke;
and if B can succeed in accepting by doing the act requested after
such revocation, no doubt the courts would hold that A is now
bound by a contract to convey, enforcible both at law and in
equity. The problems of mutuality of agreement, mutuality of
remedy, consideration, and measure of damages, would be the
same, and should be solved in the same way as in class I.
III. OPTION REGARDED AS A CONDITIONAL CONTRACT.
(a) Where the Condition is the Making of Payment.
The preceding discussion has dealt with options as consisting
of an offer and of an independent contract not to withdraw the
offer. But in -act an option may be nothing of the sort, and
options are not generally so worded as to express such a meaning.
Suppose the following: A agrees to sell certain land to B for
$1,000 if paid within thirty days, and in return -B pays $10 in
cash. This is a unilateral contract to sell on condition. There is
no offer to be accepted and none that can be revoked. Subse-
quent payment by B is not an acceptance of an offer; it is the
fulfilment of a condition precedent to A's liability on his previous
contract. B is not bound to fulfil the condition, but if he does not
fulfil it, he cannot sue for damages, for the land, or for his $10.
If A prevents B from fulfilling the condition, it would be held to
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II. OFFE~ TO MAKE A UNILATERAL CONTRACT.
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amount to a waiver of the condition, and B could maintain suit
by merely keeping his tender good.23 The performance by B of
the condition, that is, the payment of the $1,000, is not the con-
sideration for A's promise to convey. The consideration for that
promise was $10 paid. This consideration is amply sufficient at
law, in equity, and in the market place, for the conditional prom-
ise of A to convey, burdened as it was by the condition of pay-
ment of $1,000 within thirty days.
No question can arise here as to mutual assent. Upon payment
of the $10 by B, the parties are agreed. A promises and B pays.
That completes the contract, and the obligation of A attaches at
once, although it is a conditional obligation. On fulfilment of
the condition, B is entitled to a conveyance, and on A's refusal
to convey, B can sue for damages at law, or for the return of his
$10 in quasi-contract, or for specific performance in equity.24
The contract in this case is unilateral, nor can it ever become
bilateral. 25 Suppose B should notify A that he accepted and
should promise to pay the $1,000 within the thirty-day period.
This would not alter A's obligation in the least and it would be
the fulfilment of no condition. Nor would it put any obligation
on B. B's new promise to pay the $1,000 has no consideration
whatever; A does nothing in return for it. What A has done in
the past is no consideration. True, A obligated himself in the
past at B's request, but from that request there arose neither a
moral nor a legal obligation on B's part. He paid $10 for what A
did at his request, and that is regarded by the law and by mor-
ality, just as it was regarded by the parties themselves, as the
exact equivalent of A's undertaking.
There are, however, many cases holding B bound by his later
promise to pay the $1,000.26 These cases generally go upon the
theory that the option was like that stated under heading I above,
that it consisted of an offer to make a bilateral contract and an
independent unilateral contract not to withdraw the offer. If it
was the intention of the parties to make such a bilateral contract,
no exception can be taken to the decisions except as already dis-
23 Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N. Y. 469.
24 Wilks v. Ga. Pac. R. R., 79 Ala. 180 (semble)..
25 Brantly on Cont., Sec. 146, treats the contract as a bilateral one, after
acceptance, although he 'regards the original contract as a unilateral one,
and not as an offer. This appears to be an inconsistent position.
28 See below, Note 36.
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cussed under heading I. If, however, the correct analysis of the
facts in such cases shows that the transaction was a unilateral
contract to convey, conditional upon the actual making of the
payment, the decisions cannot be supported. There is, however,
another possible analysis .of the facts, and one that may support
the decisions. It will be explained under the heading that fol-
lows.
(b) Where the Condition is the Making of a Promise.
In the foregoing case the condition of the vendor's promise to
convey was actual payment by the vendee. But the condition may
be the making of a promise instead of being payment or the per-
formance of some other kind of act. Suppose the following case:
In consideration of $10 paid by B, I promise to convey Blackacre
to B on condition that he will promise, within thirty days, to pay
$1,000 for the conveyance. (Signed) A. Here A makes a uni-
lateral contract, binding him at once, and not binding B at all, but
his obligation is conditional upon B's making a promise to pay.
This promise must be made within thirty days, to fulfil the con-
dition. It is not a promise to pay within thirty days. Inasmuch
as A does not fix a time for either conveyance or payment, no
doubt by implication of law, they are to be contemporaneous acts.
B could not maintain suit on A's promise to convey without hav-
ing performed two conditions precedent, one, an express condi-
tion-the making of a promise within thirty days; the other,
implied by law and founded in equity and good conscience-a
tender of, $1,000 within a reasonable time.
Suppose that B within the thirty days makes the requested
promise to pay $1,000 to A. Is this a binding promise? There is
no doubt that if it is held to be binding on B, it will also be held,
by implication of law, to be conditional upon tender of convey-
ance-by A. But how can B's promise be regarded as binding?
What is the consideration for it? A's promise to convey was not
the consideration, for that promise was made in return for the
executed consideration of $10, its full and complete equivalent
both in law and in morals.17 The legal obligation of that promise
attached when it was made. But when B fulfils the express con-
dition and makes his promise to pay, there is a change in the
character of A's legal obligation. Prior thereto A's obligation
27 An option is not unconscionable merely because the consideration
was only $1. Mier v. Hadden, 148 Mich. 488; Cummins v. Beavers, 103 Va.
230; but cf. Murphy v. Reid, 125 Ky. 585.
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was subject to two conditions precedent. Subsequent thereto A's
obligation is subject to only one condition precedent, the one im-
plied by law. This change in the character of his obligation is a
detriment to him, one that he suffers and that the parties contem-
plated that he should suffer, in return for B's promise. This
change is contemporaneous with the making of B's promise, and
hence cannot be said to be past consideration. It is true that A
has performed no new act or forbearance. The change in the
character of his obligation is caused wholly by B's new act, the
act of promising $1,000. Probably A cannot in any way prevent
this change in his legal obligation. But all this is immaterial. It
makes no difference what is the immediate cause of the change.
The material fact is, that there is such a change, that it is a legal
detriment to A, and that it is contemplated by the parties as the
equivalent of B's promise to pay.
The change in the character of A's obligation is the considera-
tion for B's new promise to pay, but it does not follow from this
that B's new promise is a part of the consideration for A's obliga-
tion. The consideration for A's obligation remains exactly what
it was, namely, $10 in hand paid. Whenever one makes a condi-
tional promise in return for a particular consideration, the ful-
filment of the condition works an important change in the prom-
isor's situation, but it is not the making of a new contract or the
giving of a new consideration for the promise. And so, upon the
fulfilment of the condition, the unilateral contract binding A to
convey is still a unilateral contract binding A, and its considera-
tion is the very same consideration that existed from the first. It
is enforcible at law and in equity just as it was from the first.
It never was an unaccepted offer, and it is not now a newly ac-
cepted one. The only difference in it is, that one step has been
taken toward full performance. It is no longer conditional, be-
cause the condition has been fulfilled. It formerly contained an
option, whereas it now contains none, because the option has been
exercised, and the choice made.
The new promise of B to pay $1,000 is a new and separate con-
tract between the parties. It, too, is unilateral, a new obligation
to pay $1,000 resting upon B, with no new obligation upon A.
The consideration for B's new promise is fully performed and
consists of the very material change in the legal situation of A.
B's new promise is enforcible at law and in equity just as other
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was subject to two conditions precedent. Subsequent thereto A's
obligation is subject to only one condition precep.ent, the one im-
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The change in the character of 's obligation is t i r -
tion for B's new promise to pay, but it does t f ll fr t i
that B's new promise is a part of the consideration for 's li a-
tion. The consideration for A's obligation re ains exactly t
it was, namely, $10 in hand paid. henever one akes a c i-
tional promise in return for a particular consideration, t e f l-
filment of the condition works an important change in the r -
isor's situation, but it is not the making of a ne contract r t
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unilateral contracts are enforcible. Thus decisions enforcing B's
promise may be justified.
If we accept the foregoing analysis, what would be the effect of
a notice of revocation given by A to B before B had fulfilled the
condition by making his new promise to pay $1,000? It takes two
to make a contract, even a unilateral one. Perhaps, therefore, B's
new promise made after A's revocation should be held to be not
binding upon him. But even if so, this should not affect the pre-
vious obligation of A to convey. The previous contract gave B
a choice. This he can make without any assent on A's part, for it
takes only one to make a choice, or to exercise an option. Hence
it would seem, that when B makes his new promise to pay $1,000,
he fulfils the condition precedent to A's liability on his promise
to convey, and he has an immediate right to enforce A's promise
at law and in equity, whether he himself can be sued by A or not.
Even if we should assume that the condition precedent to A's
liability is the making of a binding promise by B, if A himself
prevents the fulfilment of the condition, he cannot equitably take
advantage of it, and B's suit against A for conveyance or for
damages will lie just as if the condition had been waived.28
If B's new promise is a new and separate unilateral contract,
should it not follow that B -can enforce A's previous contract to
convey without himself tendering payment? And cannot A main-
tain suit on B's promise for the $1,000 without himself tendering
a conveyance? Are not the two contracts entirely independent
and unconditional? Undoubtedly it would have been so held in
former times, 29 but it can be asserted with confidence that it
would not now be so held. It is true that as far as the express
words are concerned, both promises are unconditional, but the
courts know how to import conditions into contracts on purely
equitable grounds for the sake of justice. Or, to express it in
other words, they know how to create an equitable defence to an
action upon an entirely unconditional promise. This "imported
condition", or "equitable defence", is found by the courts entirely
outside of the terms of the contract sued upon, and frequently
outside of the unexpressed intentions of the parties, and there is
no impropriety in finding it in the terms of a separate contract.
28 Ripley v. McClure, 4 Ex. 345; United States v. Peck, 102 U. S. 64;
Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N. Y. 469; Brantly on Cont., Sec. 141;
Dig. of Just., 45, 1, 85, 7.
29-See Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wins. Saunders, 319.
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unilateral contracts are enforcible. Thus decisions enforcing B's
promise may be justified.
If we accept the foregoing analysis, what would be the ~ fect of
a notice of revocation given by A to B before B had fulfilled the
condition by making his new promise to pay $1, 0? It takes two
to make a contract, even a unilateral one. Perhaps, therefore, B's
new promise made after A's revocation should be held -to be not
binding upon him. But even if so, this should not a fect the pre-
vious obligation of A to convey. The previous contract gave B
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at law and in equity, whether he himself can be sued by A or not.
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The court will imply such a condition, or create such a defence,
in case the promisor has not received, and is not going to receive,
the substantial value that he rightly expected in exchange. Now,
in the case before us, if the promise of B to pay $1,000 is in fact
a separate unilateral contract, it is clear that A and B did not
make an exchange of promises, the obligation of the one was not
the consideration for the obligation of the other. But it is not
clear that they did not contemplate an exchange of performances.
In fact, it is certain that the parties contemplated the land and
the $1,000 as substantial equivalents, and it is not just that either
party should have both land and money at the same time, and,
hence, if either should sue the other, without first making a ten-
der of performance, he would be met by a perfect equitable
defence.
(c) Where the Condition is the Giving of Notice.
This is strictly not a separate class, all such cases falling under
headings (a) and (b). Suppose the following case: In consid-
eration of $10 paid by B, I promise to convey Blackacre to B for
$1,000, provided B shall give notice of his election by May 1st.
(Signed) A. This is one of the commonest forms of an option
contract.30 It is a unilateral contract to convey, with one express
condition. If B gives notice prior to May 1st, that he elects to
buy, he becomes entitled to enforce A's promise at law and in
equity, if within a reasonable time he tenders payment of $1,000.
Such tender would be a condition precedent by implication of
law. It should not be held, however, that B is bound to pay the
$1,000. He has made no promise and has been asked to make
none. Yet it is frequently held, that the giving of notice is by
implication the making of a promise to pay, with results similar
to those explained under heading (b) above. Of course, by
"notice" the parties may mean "notice of a promise".3
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF OPTION CoNrRACTS.
It is believed that the foregoing analysis presents means of
determining the correctness of decisions upon option contracts,
30 See Moss v. Barton, L. R. 1 Eci. Cases, 474; Buckland v. Papillon,
L. R. 2 Ch. App. 67.
31 The option holder was held bound as by a promise, after he had
given notice of acceptance, in the following cases Friary Breweries "v.
Singleton, (1899) 1 Ch. 86; 2 Ch. 261; Castle Creek W. Co. v. Aspen, 146
Fed. 8; Woods v. Hyde, 6 L. T. 317. See contra, Ranelagh v. Melton, 2
Dr. & Sm. 278 (semble).
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The court will imply such a condition, or create such a defence,
in case the promisor has not received, and is not going to receive,
the substantial value that he rightly expected in exchange. Now,
in the case before us, if the promise of B to pay $1, 0 is in fact
a separate unilateral contract, it is clear that A and B did not
make an exchange of promises, the obligation of the one was not
the consideration for the obligation of the other. But it is not
clear that they did not contemplate an exchange of performances.
In fact, it is certain that the parties .contemplated the land and
the $1,000 as substantial equivalents, and it is not just that either
party should have both land and money at the same time, and,
hence, if either should sue the other, without first making a ten-
der of performance, he ould be et by a perfect equitable
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headings (a) and (b). Suppose the following case: In consid-
eration of $10 paid by , I pro ise to vey lackacre t for
$1,000, prov:ided B shall give tice f is election ay t.
(Signed) A. This is one of the c est f r s f an ption
contract.so It is a unilateral contract t , ith e r ss
condition. If B gives notice prior t ay , t e ts t
buy, he becomes entitled to enforce ' ise t l d
equity, if within a reasonable ti e t rs ent , 00.
Such tender would be a condition r t i
law. It should not be held, ho ever, t t i
$1,000. He has made no pro ise
none. Yet it is frequently held, t at t i i
implication the aking of a pro ise t , l r
to those explained under heading ( ) .
t sl
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE F I lTRAC .
It is believed that the foregoing l sis
determining the correctness of decisions ti c tr t .
30 See oss v. BartOli, . . 1 i. ases, 4 ; 11c lld v. apillon,
L. R. 2 Ch. App. 67.
SI The option hol r as held bo as b a promise, after he had
given notice of accept(lnce, in the follo ing cases:' riary re eries ·v.
Singleton, (1899) 1 Ch. 86; 2 Ch. 261; Castle Creek W. o. v. spen, 146
Fed. 8 ; Woods v. Hyde, 6 L. T. 317. See contra, Ranelagh v. Melton, 2









There is some inconsistency and conflict in the reported cases,
but no more than in other branches of the law. It will be found
that the decisions themselves are less in conflict with each other
than are the reasons given for the decisions. Such conflict as
exists may be said to be due chiefly to three things: (1) a fail-
ure to distinguish between consideration for a promise and a con-
dition of the promisor's liability; (2) a failure to understand the
differences between unilateral and bilateral contracts; (3) and
most important of all, a failure to observe that option contracts
are capable of just as great differences in character as are other
contracts. Each of these three things necessarily involves the
other two.
(a) Enforcement Against Option Giver.
It is universally held, that where the so-called acceptance by
the option holder is given before revocation by the option giver,
a valid contract arises, specifically enforcible in equity, in those
cases where the legal remedies are deemed inadequate.3 2 This is
true irrespective of the class to which the option contract belongs,
whether I, II, or III herein.
It is almost as universally held that the option giver's promise
may be accepted and become enforcible both at law and in equity,
even though before any so-called acceptance by the option holder
one of those events occurs that are legally sufficient to revoke an
offer. For example, the death of the option giver before notice
of acceptance does not prevent equity from decreeing specific
32 Green v. Low, 2 Jur. N. S. 848; Pegg v. Wisden, 16 Beav. 239; Moss
v. Barton, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 474; Buckland v. Papillon, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 477;Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Ch. 460; Wilks v. Ga. Pac. R. Co., 79 Ala. 180;
Byers v. Denver C. R. Co., .13 Col. 552; Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary,
203 N. Y. 469; Hoogendorn v. Daniel, 178 Fed. 765; Frank v. Schnuettgen,187 Fed. 515; Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N. J. Eq. 124; Green v. Richards,
23 N. J. Eq. 33, 536; Herman v. Babcock, 103 Ind. 461; Carter v. Love, 206I1l. 310; Seyferth v. Groves & S. R .Co., 217 Ill. 483. Contra, Litz v. Goos-
ling, 93 Ky. 185; 21 L. R. A. 127. Thus an option to renew a lease will be
specifically enforced in equity in favor of the lessee. McCormick v.Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257; 1 Ames Cases Eq. 431, and note collecting
cases.
But the option holder may lose his right to specific performance bylaches; Mills v. Haywood, 6 Ch. Div. 196; and equity may refuse a remedy
on the grounds of hardship and unfairness, Talbot v. Ford, 13 Sim. 173.
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There is some inconsistency and conflict in the reported cases,
but no more than in other branches of the law. It will be found
that the decisions themselves are less in conflict with each other
than are the reasons given for the decisions. Such conflict as
exists may be said to be due chiefly to three things: (1) a fail-
ure to distinguish between consideration for a promise and a con-
dition of the promisor's liability; (2) a failure to understand the
differences between unilateral and bilateral contracts; (3) and
most important of all, a failure to observe that option contracts
are capable of just as great differences in character as are other
contracts. Each of these three things necessarily involves the
other two.
(a) Enforcement Against Option iver.
It is universally held, that where the so-called acceptance by
the option holder is given before revocation by the option giveJ,",
a valid contract arises, specifically enforcible in equity, in those
cases where the legal remedies are deemed inadequate.32 This is
true irrespective of the class to which the option contract belongs,
whether I, II, or III h~rein.
It is almost as universally held that the option giver's pro ise
may be accepted and become enforcible both at law and in equity,
even though before any so-called acceptance by the option holder
one of those events occurs that are legally sufficient to revoke an
offer. For example, the death of the option giver before notice
of acceptance does not prevent equity from decreeing specific
32 Green1J. Low, 2 Jur. N. S. 848; Pegg v. Wisdell, 16 Beav. 239; Moss
v. Barton, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 474 ~ Bllckland v. Papillon, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 477;
Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Ch. 460; WilllS v. Ga. Pac. R. Co., 79 Ala. 180;
Byers v. Denver C. R. Co., .13 Col. 552; Rocldand-R. Lime Co. v. Leary,
203 N. Y. 469; Hoogendom v. Dalliel, 178 Fed. 765; Frank v. Scll1metlgen,
187 Fed. 515; Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N. J. Eq. 124; Greelt v. Richards,
23 N. J. Eq. 33,536; Herman v. Babcock, 103 Ind. 461; Carter v. Love, 206
III. 310; Seyfertlz v. Groves & S. R .Co., 217 III. 483. Contra, Litz v. Goos-
ling, 93 Ky. 185; 21 L. R. A. 127. Thus an option to renew a lease will be
specificalIy enforced in equity in favor of the lessee. M cCornucll v.
Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257; 1 Ames Cases Eq. 431, and note colIecting
cases.
But the option holder may lose his right to specific performance by
laches; Mills v. Ha)Jwood, 6 Ch. Div. 196; and equity may refuse a remedy
on the grounds of hardship and unfairness, Talbot v. Ford, 13 Sim. 173.
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performance. 3 These cases are certainly. sound, if the contract
falls within class III, as most options probably do; but they are
more doubtful, though not entirely indefensible, if they fall
within classes I and II In like manner, the holder may enforce
the contract even though his acceptance is subsequent to a notice
of revocation and a sale to some third person who had notice of
the option.34  Of course, all conditions precedent must be ftil-
filled. 3
5
(b) Enforcement Against Option Holder.
A notice of acceptance by the option holder is almost always
held to create a bilateral contract, and suit both at law and in
equity is held to lie in favor of the option giver." These de-
cisions are sound only in case the particular contract falls within
class I or class II (b), and are incorrect if it falls in class II or
class III (a). Very likely it is true that parties who make option
contracts usually contemplate bilateral obligations, thus justify-
ing most decisions of the sort. In Woods v. Hyde,3 7 a lease con-
tained an agreement that if the lessee should desire to purchase
at £25,000 and should give notice in writing by a certain time, he
"should be entitled to become the purchaser of such premises at
the price"; and if the lessee, within three months after notice,
should pay or tender the £25,000, the lessor would convey. The
• 3 Woods v. Hyde, 6L: T. 317; Hall v. Buslinell, 14 L. T. 246; Moss v.
Barton, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 474; Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Ch. D. 640; In re
Adams & K. Vestry, 27 Ch. D. 394 (semble) ;.Douglas v. Whitmore, stated
in Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. Jr. 436; Maughlin *v. Perry, 35 Md. 352;
Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N. Y. 469; Adams v. Peabody Coal
Co., 230 Ill. 469; In re Hunter, 1 Edw. 1; Longworth v. Mitchell, 26 Ohio
St. 334; Brantly, Contr., Sec. 146. See con-tra, Newton v. Newton, 11 R. I.
390, carrying out logically the idea that an option is an offer.
34 Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352; Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153; Adams
v. Peabody Coal Co., 230 Ill. 469; Myer v. Hadden, 148 Mich. 488; 12 Ann.
Cas. 88, and note; Stitt v. Huidekopers, 17 Wall. 384; Johnston v. Trippe,
33 Fed. 530; Brantly on Contr., Sec. 146.
3 Woodruff 'v. Woodruff, 44 N. 1. Eq., 349; and see below, "Time of
the Essence."
36 Smith v. Baugham, 156 Cal. 359 (semble) ; Watford Oil Co. v. Ship-
man, 233 II. 9 (semble) : Johnston v. Trippe, 33 Fed. 530 (semble) ; Friary
Breweries v. Singleton, (1899) 1 Ch. 86; 2 Ch. 261; Castle Creek W. Co. v.
Aspen, 146 Fed. 8; see 8 Ann. Cases, 660; Mills v. Haywood, 6 Ch. D. 196
(semble) ; Linn v. McLean, 80 Ala. 360 (semble) ; Perry v. Paschal, 103 Ga.
134; Guyer v. Warren, 175 Ill. 328; Fry S. P., Sec. 465.
37 6 L. t. 317.
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performance.33 These cases are certainly,sound, if the contract
falls within class III, as most options probably do; but they are
more doubtful, though not entirely indefensible, if they fa l
ithin classes I and II., In like manner, the holder may enforce
the contract even though his acceptance is subsequent to a notice
of revocation and a sale to so e third person who had notice of
the option.34 Of course, all conditions precedent ust be frtl-
filled.35
(b) Enforcement gainst ption older.
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31 6 L. T. 317.
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court (Wood, V. C.) overruled a demurrer to a bill for specific
performance by the heir of the option giver against the option
holder, and said, "Contract complete from the moment that the
defendants had given the notice. That having given that notice,
they could not withdraw from the purchase." But in a case ex-
actly like this, Kindersley, V. C., thought the contrary, and said
that the vendor could not compel the vendee to pay even though
the latter had given the required three months notice of accept-
ance. He says, "could the owner at any time say to the lessees,
'you have given me this notice of your desire, and now I will file
a bill to compel you to complete', although the lessees, until they
have paid the money have never performed the condition; and
they might say, 'we do not mean to perform it'? Could he apply
to compel them? Impossible."'8
ASSIGNMENT OF OPTION CONTRACTS.
It may be laid down as a general principle, with exceptions as
below, that an option contract is binding upon the assigns and
successors of the option giver and that it is enforcible by the
assigns of the option holder. This shows that in fact most option
contracts must belong to class III, that they are contracts to con-
vey on condition, and not mere offers with a promise to hold the
offei-s open. An offer made to a specific person cannot be ac-
cepted by anybody else, and the offeree has nothing to assign. It
has, in fact been held that an option contract is not assignable."
There is, however, overwhelming authority to show that the as-
signee of the option holder may enforce the contract.40 So, the
contract will be enforced in favor of the administrator of a lessee
who had an option to buy; 41 of the heir of such a lessee; 42 of the
option holder's committee in lunacy;43 of equitable assignees
where no legal transfer has been made;44 and of assignees in
38 Ranelagh v. Melton, 2 Dr. & Sm. 278; 10 Jur. N. S., 1141.
39 Rease v. Kittle, (W. Va.) 49 S. E. 150.
40 Wilks v. Ga. Pac. R. R., 79 Ala. 180 (semble) ; Cummins v. Beavers,
103 Va. 230; Perry v. Paschal, 103 Ga. 134; Douglas v. Whitmore, stated in
Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. Jr. 456; House v. Jackson, 24 Ore. 89.
41 In re Adams & K. Vestry, 27 Ch. D. 394.
42 Ankeny v. Richardson, 187 Fed. 550; this is probably unsound, for
the benefit of the option contract is generally held to be personal property
and to belong to the executor for the benefit of the next of kin. See below,
Notes 56 and 57.
43 Dibbins v. Dibbins, (1896) 2 Ch. 348 (semble).
44Friary Breweries v. Singleton, (1899) 1 Ch. 86; 2 Ch. 261.
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Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. Jr. 456; House v. Jacks01~, 24 re. 89.
41 111 re Adams & K. Vestry, 27 Ch. D. 394.
42AIlkellY v. Richardsoll, 187 Fed. 550; this is probably unsound, for
the benefit of the option contract is generally held to be personal property
and to belong to the executor for the benefit of the next f i . ee l ,
Notes 56 and 57.
43 DibbillS v. Dibbills, (1896) 2 Ch. 348 (semble).
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OPTION CONTRACTS
bankruptcy.45 The option contract may be made to the option
holder and assigns ;41 or it may be made expressly non-assign-
able.4 7 Of course, the option holder cannot substitute some other's
responsibility and credit for his own; the assignee has no remedy
until he sees that all conditions precedent are fulfilled.
A grantee from the option giver may always retain the property
if he is a purchaser for value without notice. This is because
the grantee gets legal title and has equal equity. A grantee from
the option giver may retain the property even though he had notice
and gave no value, in case the option was not a contract but was
a mere offer and had not been accepted prior to conveyance. 48 and
perhaps also in case the option was a contract under seal but with-
out consideration.40 In the latter case, the option holder would
have no remedy at law against the grantee because of lack of
privity, and he would have no remedy in equity against the
grantee because he has given no consideration.
A grantee from the option giver may never retain the property
as against an option holder tvho has given consideration for his
option, in case such grantee had notice of the option. 0 And the
same is true where the option was a mere offer, if the offer was
properly accepted and the grantee had notice thereof before his
own right accrued."' The heir or devisee of the option giver will
take subject to the rights of the option holder, and the latter may
obtain a decree for specific performance against him.
52
45Buckland v. Papillon, L. R. "1 Eq. Cas. 477; 2 Ch. App. 67; assignable
even though assigns were not mentioned in the option.
46 Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352; Pearson v. Millard, 150 N. C. 303.
47 Behrens v. Cloudy, 50 Wash. 400; Myers v. Stone, 128 Ia. 10.
4 8 As in Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653; Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch..D.-463;
Peacock v. Deweese, 73 Ga. 570.
40 Graybill v. Brugh, 89 Va. 895; but see note 19 above.
50 Mills v. Haywood, 6 Ch. D. 196 (semble); Manchester Ship Canal
Co. v. Manchester R. Co. (1901), 2 Ch. 37 (semble) ; Hersey v. Giblett, 18
Beav. 174; Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403; Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153; Bir-
ninghain Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421. This is not because the
option holder has an interest in the land, but because there is an implied
negative covenant binding the option giver not to sell to others.
51 Mansfield v. Hodgdon, 147 Mass. 304.
52 Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox 167; Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591;
Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Ch. D. 640; Rockland-R. Lime Co. v. Leary, 203
N. Y. 469; Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421 (devisee).
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CHARACTER OF OPTION HOLDER'S INTEREST.
There are many dicta to the effect that an option holder has no
estate or interest in the land on which he has an option. "3 This is
correct in case the option is to be regarded as a mere offer to sell.
But where the option is in fact a conditional contract to convey,
the option holder should be held to have an interest in the land,
within the meaning of the.statute of frauds, just as it is held in
the case of those who hold a contract right of purchase, but with
no option.5 4 In fact it is not unusual for the option holder's right
to be called an equitable interest.15
It has also been held that on the death of the option holder,
before notice of acceptance, the right passes, not to the heir, but
to the personal representative. " This seems to be a sound ruling,
because the option holder had not bound himself to buy, and his
heir or devisee should not be permitted to take funds from the
personal estate and use them to buy land for his own benefit, when
the option holder had never indicated an intention to do so him-
self. 7 The option holder had the right to do so, but he was not
bound to do so. The possession of such a right does not operate
as an equitable conversion of the amount of the price to be paid,
so that it should thereafter be regarded as dedicated to the use of
the heir. In this respect there is a great difference between the
position of the option giver and the option holder. Where there
has been made a valid bilateral contract to convey land for a price,
the vendor is held to have worked an equitable conversion of the
land into personalty, and in case of death before conveyance, the
vendor's executor can enforce the contract for the benefit of the
E3 Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5; Myers v. Stone, 128 Ia. 10; Bostwick v.
Hess, 80 Ill. 138; Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester R. Co., (1901)
2 Ch. 37. But held in Buckland v. Papillon, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 67, that an
option for a lease was an interest in the land within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act.
r4 See Dougherty v. Catlett, 129 Ill. 431.
"'f People's R. Co. v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85; Thompson v. Thompson, 1
Jones 430; Thalheimer v. Tischler, 55 Fla. 796; London Co. v. Gomm, 20
Ch. D. 562.
56 it re Adams & K. Vestry, 24 Ch. D. 199; 27 Ch. D. 394; Brantly on
Contr. 146. In Gustin v. Union School Dist., 94 Mich. 502, the Court said:
"The deceased (option holder) had merely a right to acquire an interest,
and at his death nothing descended to his heirs. The lease, however, with
the accompanying right to purchase, did pass to his representatives."
5 7 Fry S. P., Sec. 218.
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next of kin, to the exclusion of the heir; 58 and to the exclusion
of a devisee of the land, in case the contract was made subse-
quent to the execution of the will. 9 In like manner, the vendee,
having bound himself to accept conveyance and to pay the price,
has worked a similar equitable conversion of the amount of the
purchase price to be paid by him, and his heir or devisee can
compel the executor to apply the money to purchase the land,"
or otherwise for the benefit of the heir or devisee,61 to the ex-
clusion of the next of kin. An option contract, on the other hand,
is a unilateral contract. The option giver is bound to convey,
but the option holder is not bound to buy. As should be ex-
pected, the result of this is, that the option giver is held to have
worked an equitable conversion of his land in case the conditions
of the contract are fulfilled. If the option holder ,fulfils those
conditions, subsequent to the death of the option giver, the
English courts hold, that the personal representative of the ven-
dor, and not the heir, will get the money. 2 But the option holder
has not bound himself to buy, and has therefore worked no
equitable conversion of his personal estate. If he dies without
becoming bound, his heir should not profit, for it is not shown
that the deceased desired him to profit. The doctrine of equitable
conversion rests wholly upon the supposed intention and desire
of the deceased, and in this case the deceased expressed no in-
tention. But the deceased had a valid contract right, a chose in
action. It is property, and belongs to his estate. But it is per-
sonal property and goes to the executor as such.
From the foregoing, it appears that the position of the option
giver is almost identical with that of any one who has made a
binding contract to convey. This could scarcely be so, if the
option were nothing more than an unaccepted offer. In fact, it
is nearly always a present contract to convey on condition, and
should be so treated.
Some of the American courts hold that the equitable conversion
r'sBubb's Case, Freeman C. C. 38; I Ames Cases Eq., 194.
59 Mayer v. Gowland, 2 Dickens 563.
00 Milner v. Mills, Moseley, 123; IAmes Eq. Cas., 191; Daire v. Bev-
ersham, Nelson 76; I Ames 192.
1 1Matthews v. Gadd, 2 South Australia L. R. 129; 1 Ames 193.
_
2Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox 167; Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591; 1
Ames 199.
HeinOnline -- 23 Yale L.J. 661 1913-1914
I ACTS 661
next of kin, to the exclusion of the heir ;58 and to the exclusion
of a devisee of the land, in case the contract as ade subse-
uent to the ecution of the i l.59 I li e a er, t e vendee,
having und i self to accept eyance nd to ay the rice,
has orked a si ilar equitable conversion of t e a ount of the
purchase rice t e paid hi , and is ir r evisee can
co pel the e ecutor t ly t oney to purchase t e l 6o
r t envise f r t e benefit f the eir r de i 1 t t e -
cl sion f t e ext f i . n ti tr t, ther hand,
is a il t ral tract. tion i er i bound to c .ey,
t t e ti n l er is ot ound to . s l -
t , t e r lt f t is i , t at ti r is eld
r ed itable ersion f is t e itions
f t e c tract re l ill . f tion l er -fulfil
iti , ent t t e ath f tion i , t
lish t l , t al tative f t e -
r, a t t ir, ill t t e .02 t t i l er
s t und i lf , s 'fore
it l rsion i l . f t
i , ld t IS t
t t t i it. i t le
r i sed
f t , ~ ased
t ti . t t li tr ct
ti . , t .
l t
ti
i r i l t i ti l o
i i t t
ti r t i
t
ro8 ll b's se, . ses
roo yer . O~lJ d,
00 il er . ills, l , ; l . ., ire .
c ,
01 tt c s . add, . .
62 c net , ll v. ll, Y .
R
q k nn h
o h v a
h
y h
x o e a
o
n c
e e v s
o n b d e
h i t
i se




a se r ed
s t
r t









of the option giver's land does not take place until notice of ac-
ceptance by the option holder. 3 Possibly these decisions can be
justified on the ground that no conversion should be held to take
place in the case of any conditional contract to convey, until the
fulfilmerlt of the condition.
If the premises are destroyed by fire, before the option holder
has fulfilled the condition, by giving notice or otherwise, it has
been held that the option holder is entitled to the insurance if he
fulfils the condition later.64
In England it has been held, that an option on land for an in-
definite time is obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities. 65
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.
In option contracts time is nearly always of the essence. 0
This would be so on either theory of an option. If we regard it
as an offer, it is open for a time limited and no offer can be ac-
cepted after its lapse. 7 If we regard it as a conditional contract,
it contains the express condition that notice shall be given or that
money shall be paid by a specified time. Such an express condi-
tion should be enforced according to its terms, unless such en-
forcement will result in an inequitable forfeiture. In these cases
there is no such forfeiture; the option holder has received full
value for the consideration he paid for the option itself, and he
has as yet paid nothing on the contract of sale. He is in statu quo.
There may be more than one act, the performance of which by
63 Smith v. Loewenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346; Rockland-R. Lime Co. v.
Leary, 203 N. Y. 469.
64 Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50; People's Street R. Co. v. Spencer,
156 Pa. 85. Contra, Edwards v. West, 7 Ch. D. 858; Gilbert v. Port, 28
Ohio St. 276. Of course, the option contract may itself show which party
is beneficiary. Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass. 570.
015London Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, overruling on this point Bir-
minyham Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 432; but see Muller v. Trafford,
(1901) 1 Ch. 54; Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester R. Co., (1901)
2 Ch. 37.
6 Barrel v. Sabine, 1 Vernon, 268; Dibbins v. Dibbins, (1896) 2 Ch.
348; Campbell v. London Co., 5 Hare, 519, 529; Potts v. Whitehead, 20
N. J. Eq. 55; Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352; White v. Hanford Bank,
148 Cal. 552; Neill v. Hitchman, 201 Pa. 207; Kemp v. Humphreys, 13 Ill.
573; Longfellow v. Moore, 102 Ill. 289; Harding v. Gibbs, 125 Ill. 85; Wat-
son v. Coast, 35 W. Va. 463. But a condition that rent shall have been
"duly" paid does not mean "punctually". Starkey v. Barton, (1909) 1 Ch.
284.
67 Haughwout v. Boisaubin, 18 N. J. Eq. 318.
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the exact time specified is a condition precedent. Frequently the
option giver promises to convey if the option holder shall give
notice of his election by a fixed time, and shall pay the price
within another fixed time thereafter."8 In Ranelagh v. Melton,6"
a lease provided that "in case the lessees shall give three months
notice to the lessor and shall, at the expiration of such notice,
pay unto him the sum of £210 * * * the lessor will convey." The
money was not tendered until ten days after the expiration of
the three months notice, and the court refused to compel the
lessor to convey. This decision is correct because payment by a
day certain' was an express condition precedent. The court
should not disregard it, and hold the defendant on a promise with
a different condition, unless the plaintiff is about to suffer an un-
reasonable forfeiture. Here it is not so. The reason given by
the court, however, was that the relation of vendor and purchaser
did not exist until actual payment, regarding the option as being
the offer of a promise for an act, as in class II herein. This
analysis seems to be incorrect, even though the decision is sound.
The contract should be regarded as a conditional contract to sell,
dating from the time the lease was executed, the consideration
being the covenant, to pay rent.
If the condition is only that notice shall be given within a cet-
tain time,, and no time is specified for the making of payment, a
delay in paying is not fatal to the optibn holder.70 Of course, if
the option specifies no particular time for either notice or pay-




68 Ranelagh v. Melton, 2 Dr. & Sm. 278; 10 Jur. N. S. 1141; Rockland-
R. Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N. Y. 469. There may also be other conditions
precedent, e.g., appraisal, Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349.
89 2 Dr. & Sm. 278; 10 Jur. N. S. 1141.
70 Pegg v. Wisden, 16 Beav. 239; Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Ch. D. 460;
Friary Breweries v. Singleton, (1899) 1 Ch. 86; 2 Ch. 261; Maughlin v.
Perry, 35 Md. 352.
71 Moss v. Barton, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 474. (A three-year lease with option
for a renewal for 5, 7, 14, or 21 years from expiration. Lessee continued
to occupy, but gave no notice until four years after expiration of first
lease. Specific performance decreed.) Buckland v. Papillon, L. R. 2 Ch.
App. 67; 1 Eq. Cas. 477; IJersey v. Giblett, 18 Beav. 174; Byers v. Denver
C. R. Co., 13 Cblo. 552.
A reasonable time will be allowed. Larmon v. Jordan, 56 Ill. 204; Stone
v. Harmon, 31 Minn. 512; Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 565.
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